Abstract-This article presents new approaches to system verification and synthesis based on subsystem verification and the novel combined use of counterexamples and heuristics to identify suitable subsystems incrementally. The scope of safety properties considered is limited to behavioral inclusion and controllability. The verification examples considered provide a comparison of the approaches presented with straightforward state exploration and an understanding of their applicability in an industrial context. Index Terms-Control systems, controllability, formal languages, search methods, software requirements and specifications, software verification and validation.
Incremental verification approaches are not new and have been used to improve performance of model checking procedures. A number of abstraction techniques have been proposed to simplify the verification task, for example in [1] and [2] ; also [3] suggests the use of counterexamples for CTL model checking. The work presented in this article is based on the discrete-event system framework of [4] [5] [6] [7] and proposes new approaches to system verification and synthesis based on subsystem verification and the novel combined use of counterexamples and heuristics to identify suitable subsystems incrementally. Earlier related work by the authors is found in [8] and has been extended with respect to synthesis in [9] .
II. NOTATION AND PRELIMINARIES
The following summary of notions and terms from supervisory control theory has been composed from several sources, but principally from [4] and [5] . The concepts of synchronous communication used in this framework are adaptations of earlier work in the field of process algebras [10] , [11] .
A. Languages
Event sequences and languages are simple means of describing discrete system behaviors. In this context, we consider an alphabet as a finite set of distinct events. By we denote the set of all finite strings of the form , where and . Furthermore it is convenient to introduce the empty string , where . Then we write . A language over is any subset . The length of a string is the number of symbols in . The catenation of two strings , is written as . Languages and alphabets can also be catenated; we write . For a string we say that is a prefix of and write , if for some . The prefix-closure of a language is the set of all prefixes of strings in , i.e., . A language is called prefix-closed if . For the purpose of this paper, which is restricted to safety properties, it is sufficient to consider only prefix-closed languages.
B. Automata
Languages can be represented naturally by means of automata. An automaton is a 4-tuple , where is an alphabet of events, is the state set (assumed to be finite and nonempty), is the transition function, and is the initial state. The transition function is defined at each state only for some of the events , i.e., is a partial function. The transition function is extended to a partial function by letting and provided that and are defined. The possible behavior of an automaton is described by the language . Automata are represented visually by means of state transition graphs. An example is shown in Fig. 1 ; states are represented as nodes, with the initial state highlighted, the transition function is represented by labeled edges; if , then the graph contains an edge from node to labeled .
C. Synchronous Product
Several automata can be combined into a single, more complex automaton by means of the synchronous product operation. Let , and be two automata, both using the alphabet . Then their synchronous product is defined as where provided that and are both defined. Thus, the synchronous product of two automata defines how two automata are composed by synchronising them on their events. Its state set consists of the Cartesian product of the state sets of the composed automata. Its language is seen to be the intersection of the languages of the composed automata, i.e., (1) We define for future reference the neutral element with respect to synchronous composition, such that and for any automaton . 
D. Relevant Event Set
The synchronous product as defined above can only be used for the composition of automata with the same event alphabet. In order to compose two automata with different event alphabets and , these must be extended to consider the alphabet by adding selfloops with the missing events to all their states. Fig. 2 shows how the automaton Buffer of Fig. 1 , originally with alphabet , has been extended to consider the alphabet by adding selfloops with corresponding event labels.
Given such an extended automaton, it is interesting to determine which events are selflooped at every state of the automaton, being effectively irrelevant to the automaton's behavior and which events are associated with meaningful state transitions relevant to the automaton's behavior. Accordingly, we introduce the notion of relevant and irrelevant events. For a language , an event is said to be irrelevant for , if we have for all , if and only if (2) Otherwise is called relevant for . The set of all relevant events for a language is denoted by is relevant for
Accordingly, an event will be said to be relevant or irrelevant for an automaton if it is relevant or correspondingly irrelevant for the language . For convenience, we will picture automata with relevant events only, unless otherwise stated.
E. Supervisory Control
In order to introduce the notion of supervisory control, the set of events is partitioned into two disjoint subsets of events: the subset of controllable events and the subset of uncontrollable events. Controllable events may be enabled or disabled by an external agent; uncontrollable events are spontaneous.
Let be a prefix-closed language describing a possible system behavior, and let be another prefix-closed language describing a desired system behavior.
is defined to be controllable with respect to if (4) In other words, a language is controllable with respect to if there is no string in that can be followed by an uncontrollable event possible in but not possible in . This means that, given a possible system behavior , the behavior given by can be achieved by disabling controllable events only. Note that the languages , , and are all trivially controllable with respect to .
We introduce the set of all sublanguages of a language that are controllable with respect to (5) It is easy to show that the union of any number of controllable languages is again controllable [4] . Therefore, the set contains a unique supremal element (6) This supremal element is known as the supremal controllable sublanguage of with respect to [12] . It is the maximally permissive behavior achievable through control within .
III. VERIFICATION AND SYNTHESIS

A. Behavioral Inclusion
Let a system and requirements be modeled as automata. We define behavioral inclusion as follows.
Definition 1: Let and be two automata using the same alphabet . We say that satisfies if . Thus, satisfies if every string of events accepted by the automaton is also accepted by the requirements automaton . In order to test whether this condition is true for and , we can construct the synchronous product of and and check at each reachable combination of states whether there exists an event possible in which is not allowed in . If such a state combination exists, does not satisfy the requirements , otherwise it does.
In practice, however, the system and the requirements are typically specified as the synchronous composition of several automata and not as single automata, i.e., Note that the synchronous composition of the automata and may be large and impossible to construct explicitly. The language of a composed system consists of the intersection of the languages of its components, 1 i.e., Synchronous composition, by definition, always restricts the system behavior and never enlarges it. This leads to the following simple result.
Proposition 1: Let , be two languages and let . If then .
1 See (1).
Assume we want to check whether
According to Proposition 1, in order to show that satisfies , it is enough to find a subsystem of satisfying . In particular, in order to prove (7) , it is enough to show that there exists a set of indexes such that satisfies (8) In case the requirements are specified as the synchronous product of several automata, the following result can be used to simplify checking behavioral inclusion.
Proposition 2: Let , be two languages and let . Then we have if and only if and . Accordingly, in order to prove that a system satisfies multiple requirements, we can prove that the system satisfies each requirement in turn. In particular, in order to prove that satisfies we can equivalently prove that satisfies Finally, Propositions 1 and 2 can also be used to prove that a system , specified as the synchronous product of several automata, satisfies multiple requirements by finding different subsystems of satisfying each requirement individually. How to find suitable subsystems of automatically is addressed in Section IV.
B. Controllability
System behaviors cannot always be shown to satisfy behavioral requirements. If the requirements are not satisfied, we can try to enforce them through control, i.e., through the disablement of controllable events.
The notion of controllability introduced in (4) allows us to characterize the languages that may be kept within another language through control. In the following, we will also refer to requirement as being controllable with respect to a system , if is controllable with respect to . Assume a requirements automaton to be controllable with respect to a system . Then, when composed with , will restrict the behavior of to remain within the behavior of , such that . For future reference, the definition of controllability is extended to consider any set of events.
Definition 2: Let , be two prefix-closed languages and let
. is called -controllable with respect to if . This definition extends (4) by replacing the fixed set of uncontrollable events by an arbitrary subset , enabling us to consider any set of events as the set of uncontrollable events.
In order to check whether is controllable with respect to , we can build the synchronous product and check at each reachable combination of states whether there exists an uncontrollable event possible in but not in . Fortunately, as in the case of behavioral inclusion, and are typically specified as the synchronous composition of several automata, allowing subsystems of and to be considered instead for verification purposes, as described in the following propositions.
Proposition 3: Let , , be prefix-closed languages and let . Also let . If is -controllable with respect to , then is -controllable with respect to . Proof: Simply observe that . Thus, as in the case of behavioral inclusion (Proposition 1), to show that is controllable with respect to it is enough to find a subsystem of such that is controllable with respect to . In particular, in order to check whether is controllable with respect to (9) it is enough to show that there exists a set of indexes such that is controllable with respect to (10) In case requirements are specified as the synchronous product of several automata, the following extension of the corresponding result of [4] can be used to simplify checking controllability. This result can be paraphrased by saying that the intersection of two controllable languages is itself controllable. In other words, if requirements to be checked for controllability are specified as the synchronous product of several automata, it is enough to prove that each automaton is itself controllable. In particular, in order to check whether is controllable with respect to (11) it is enough to show that is controllable with respect to (12) for each . Note that the converse of Proposition 4 is not true. Since the composition of two uncontrollable behaviors may be controllable, checking (12) provides only a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for the controllability of the composed behavior. Nevertheless, Proposition 4 can be used to develop interesting ways of checking controllability. For example, requirements specified as the synchronous composition of several automata, can be shown to be controllable with respect to a system , if can be grouped into sets of automata controllable with respect to . Thus, in order to check condition (11), we can try finding index sets , covering all the automata constituting , such that each corresponding subsystem of is controllable with respect to , i.e., such that is controllable with respect to (13) for each , with
Note that in (13), subsystems of can be considered instead of using (10) . If some requirements from are known to be controllable with respect to , the following result allows us to modify (11) . That is, if one of the requirements of in (11), for example , is known to be controllable with respect to , (11) can be shown by verifying that is controllable with respect to (14) which is likely to be simpler than proving (11) , because fewer requirements need to be shown to be controllable with respect to the extended system . While Propositions 3, 4, and 5 show that given requirements can be verified to be controllable with respect to a given system, by verifying requirement subsets to be controllable with respect to one or more subsystems, we will now consider the use of subsets of uncontrollable events. Thus, instead of considering all controllable events at once and verifying requirements to be controllable with respect to a given system, we can verify multiple times the requirements to be controllable, each time considering different subsets of uncontrollable events. In particular, it is possible to consider each uncontrollable event on its own. That is, in order to verify whether controllable with respect to (15) we can equivalently check that controllable with respect to (16) for each , i.e., potentially simpler checks are carried out, assuming each time all uncontrollable events but one to be controllable, instead of one single more complex check, considering all uncontrollable events at once. Note that Proposition 6 should typically be used together with Propositions 3, 4, and 5.
C. Synthesis
If both the behavioral inclusion and the controllability checks fail, i) the system considered is known not to satisfy the requirements of interest; and ii) its behavior cannot be restricted through control to satisfy the corresponding requirements. Typically, the system will require a redesign. For this purpose, supervisory control [4] provides a means to synthesise (when possible) least restrictive and controllable components in the form of automata which composed with the original system, guarantee that the composed system satisfies behavioral inclusion and controllability requirements. Such synthesised components are sometimes also referred to as supervisors [4] .
Similarly to the results of the above sections, the following results show how the modular structure of a system and requirements composed of several automata can be used for synthesis purposes. Consider a system behavior , and a requirements specification consisting of several automata, i.e., Proposition 7 enables us to obtain synthesised components , for each , such that , whose composition is equivalent to the synthesised least restrictive component such that . Proposition 8: Let , , be prefix-closed languages and let . Then is controllable with respect to .
Proof: By construction of the supremal controllable language, we have that is controllable with respect to . Then it follows from Proposition 3 that is controllable with respect to .
Proposition 8 is useful in case the system behavior is specified as the synchronous product of several automata
In this case, we can try synthesising components , for each , such that . If this fails, i.e., some is empty, we can try grouping system behaviors and synthesising supervisors for groups of subsystems of . Proposition 8 tells us that the composition of all supervisors obtained in such a way is again controllable.
However, it is important to note that components which have been synthesised for a subsystem of will be least restrictive for , but not necessarily for itself. Accordingly, the composition of such components may also not be least restrictive for .
Proposition 8 has been extended in [9] to show that the composition of components synthesised with respect to two different system behaviors yields a least restrictive supervisor if the two system behaviors do not share any uncontrollable events. An alternative proof of the result in [9] is provided below. Again, we assume the system behavior to be composed of several automata
In order to apply Proposition 9, we split the index set into two disjoint sets and . In addition, we require the subsystems to be such that the automata constituting do not have any relevant uncontrollable events in common with any of the automata constituting , nor with the requirement . If this is the case, we can synthesise a component such that . Proposition 9 guarantees that the behavior of composed with is identical to the behavior of composed with the component , such that . In case both the system behavior and the requirements are specified as the synchronous product of several automata, we can use Propositions 7 and 9 jointly, by considering each requirement in turn, applying Proposition 9 finding for an appropriate subsystem of , and synthesising a component such that . The composed behavior will be the same as the behavior . This approach works well if for each requirement , a small set of system behaviors constituting the subsystem of can be found. In practice, this is often the case since system behaviors typically only share few uncontrollable events. A simple algorithm for finding the smallest set of system behaviors needed for a given requirement is provided in [9] .
IV. PROOF SEARCH BY COUNTEREXAMPLES
We have seen in Section III that it is possible to verify that a system satisfies given behavioral requirements, such as language inclusion and controllability, by verifying that one or more subsystems satisfy these requirements. The identification of suitable subsystems, in an automated fashion, remains one of the key challenges of such verification approaches.
Verification algorithms, able to determine whether given behavioral requirements are satisfied, will also produce counterexamples showing why the requirements are not satisfied. Furthermore, such diagnostic information may be used, as is shown below, to identify suitable subsystems, thereby guiding an automated proof search.
A. Incremental Behavioral Inclusion Check
Assume we want to check whether a system satisfies some behavioral requirements , and consider an arbitrary subsystem of . If the subsystem satisfies the behavioral requirements , we know by Proposition 1 that the entire system also satisfies the requirements . Otherwise there must exist a counterexample showing that does not satisfy , i.e., there must exist a string such that
In this case we can check whether the remaining components of accept the string . In particular, we consider in turn each automaton of not belonging to the subsystem , and check whether . Note that checking whether a string is accepted by a deterministic automaton is a simple task with complexity bounded in the length of the string; it is enough to trace a path through the automaton using the string's events, starting at the initial state.
If is accepted by all the automata of not belonging to , we can immediately conclude that the behavioral requirement is not satisfied; we have found a string such that Thus, is a counterexample showing that does not satisfy .
Otherwise there must be at least one automaton not accepting , i.e.,
In this case, we augment the subsystem with the automaton and check whether satisfies Note that augmenting with an automaton accepting makes no sense since we already know there exists a counterexample such that . Accordingly, the subsystem is augmented incrementally until it is either shown to satisfy the requirements , or a counterexample accepted by is found, showing that itself does not satisfy .
In order to illustrate the above procedure, we consider a simple manufacturing system consisting of two machines and a buffer of size one [4] . The system components are modeled as automata and are shown in Fig. 1 . Machine1 is initially in its idle state (I). It may start , entering its working state (W). When working, the machine may finish , returning to its idle state (I), or it may break down entering its down state (D). It can then be repaired , returning to its idle state (I).Machine2 works in an identical fashion. The two machines are linked by a buffer of size one, and whenever Machine1 finishes , it places a workpiece in the buffer, and whenever Machine2 starts , it removes a workpiece from the buffer.
The automata Buffer and specify the following behavioral requirements. The buffer must never overflow or underflow, i.e., Machine1 must never finish operating while a workpiece is present in the buffer and Machine2 must never start operating unless a workpiece is present in the buffer. Furthermore, Machine2 has repair and return-to-service priority over Machine1, i.e., in case both machines are down, Machine2 must be repaired and returned to service first.
Please recall that, for convenience, automata are shown without irrelevant events, i.e., the automaton Buffer in Fig. 1 is understood to behave like the automaton in Fig. 2 .
We will check whether our manufacturing system
Machine Machine Buer satisfies the behavioral requirement of Fig. 3 , specifying that the two machines always start alternatingly, i.e., we will check whether
Machine Machine Buer
By Proposition 1, it is enough to find a subsystem of satisfying . We start by considering an automaton able to generate the set of all finite strings, i.e., we let , and check whether (17) This is easily found not to be the case, producing the counterexample which is not accepted by . Note that in our implementation, the checking of (17) is simply performed by inspecting the automaton ; we do not construct the automaton . Having obtained the counterexample , we check whether this is a counterexample for the entire system, i.e., we check whether each of the automata of Fig. 1 Buer Machine (19) and obtain the counterexample accepted by the entire system . Accordingly, we conclude that does not satisfy the behavioral requirement . Inspecting the counterexample , we can see that the two machines cannot be started alternatingly in case Machine1 breaks down, since the latter will have to be started again.
Note that we only needed to compose two out of four automata to show that does not satisfy , and that these were identified automatically through the use of counterexamples.
B. Incremental Controllability Check
Assume we want to check whether is controllable with respect to (20) According to Proposition 4, it is enough to show all requirement automata , , to be controllable with respect to the complete system behavior , either on their own or composed with other requirement automata. This can in turn be simplified considering Proposition 3 and identifying suitable subsystems of to be used instead of . In the following, let be the composition of several requirement automata for which we try to prove controllability with respect to a subsystem of . Initially, we let , for some . We start by checking whether is controllable with respect to the set of all finite strings, i.e., , accept , the composed requirements may still be controllable with respect to as described in ii).
Steps i) and ii) are repeated, augmenting and , until either is shown to be controllable with respect to , or and can no longer be augmented; a counterexample has been found, accepted by the system and requirement automata , showing not to be controllable with respect to . In case is found to be controllable with respect to , the remaining requirement automata in must next be shown to be controllable.
Note that checking to be controllable with respect to in i) is usually easier than checking to be controllable with respect to in ii), since in this case more requirements ( compared to ) are considered with respect to comparatively fewer system automata ( compared to ). Accordingly and if possible, it may be preferable to select i) over ii). We have implemented both, i.e., preferring i) over ii) and not preferring i) over ii); the experimental results are shown in Table III and discussed in Section V-B. We now consider Proposition 6, which allows us to divide up the task of proving controllability in simpler subtasks, i.e., instead of carrying out one check considering the complete set of uncontrollable events, several checks are carried out instead, considering subsets of uncontrollable events. Proving controllability of a requirement with few relevant uncontrollable events will typically require considering few system components sharing these events. In particular, requirements with no relevant uncontrollable event are controllable per definition.
Consider again the small manufacturing example of the previous Section. We will check whether the automata Buffer and of Fig. 1 and the automaton of Fig. 3 can actually implement the behavior they describe. Recall that the automata Buffer and specify respectively that the buffer must never overflow or underflow, and that Machine2 has repair and return-to-service priority over Machine1. The automaton specifies that the two machines must always finish their work alternatingly. Accordingly, we will check whether . Inspecting the counterexample, we see that that the two machines can finish in any order, when simultaneously in their working state (W).
The above proof searches are shown in tree form in Fig. 4 . Each node of the tree represents a step of the proof and lists the requirement and system automata composed in that step, together with the counterexample obtained. if any. We note that in the second step of the controllability proof of , had we selected Buffer instead of Machine1, then Machine1 would have been selected in the next step.
The above proof is now simplified using Proposition 6 and considering one uncontrollable event at a time. Accordingly, in order to prove (21) , it is enough to check whether Buer controllable with respect to
Machine Machine
We need to check each of the three requirement automata to be controllable with respect to Machine , each time assuming all uncontrollable events but one to be controllable. Fortunately, most of these checks turn out to be trivial. For example, the event is seen to be irrelevant for any of the requirement automata, automatically implying these to be -controllable with respect to Machine Machine . Similarly, for only the requirement must be shown to be -controllable with respect to Machine Machine . The nontrivial proofs are described in tree form in Fig. 5 . Note that the requirement is considered twice, once for and once for . Also note that, in the -controllability proof of , only Machine1 and Buffer need to be considered. In comparison, recall that Machine1, Machine2, and Buffer were needed in the previous proof considering the complete set of uncontrollable events.
C. Heuristics
The incremental-verification algorithms presented in this paper are guided by counterexamples obtained from failed analysis attempts to verify that a system satisfies given behavioral requirements by verifying that one or more subsystems satisfy the same requirements. Although there may exist several counterexamples showing why one or more subsystems do not satisfy the requirements considered, the implementation presented always uses the first minimal-length counterexample found. We have not investigated in this work the use of alternative counterexamples, which remains an interesting question for future research.
Given a counterexample, the incremental-verification algorithms presented look for automata not accepting the particular counterexample to include one or more of these automata in the next analysis attempt. As seen in the previous section, there may be cases in which multiple automata are found not to accept a particular counterexample . Experience shows that choosing the right automata may be crucial and can make the difference between a quick proof or no proof, i.e., a proof-search blowup.
A number of heuristics for selecting automata not accepting a counterexample of interest are presented below. They have all been implemented, and thoroughly tested on the industrial examples of Section V-B.
• All. This heuristic simply selects all the automata not accepting the counterexample . • EarlyNotAccept. This heuristic selects the automaton rejecting the counterexample as early as possible, i.e., the automaton accepting as little as possible of the counterexample .
• LateNotAccept. This heuristic selects the automaton rejecting the counterexample as late as possible, i.e., the automaton accepting as much as possible of the counterexample .
• MaxCommonEvents. This heuristic selects the automaton with the maximum number of relevant events in common with the system considered so far. Recall that relevant events are defined by (2) . An automaton sharing a large number of relevant events with the system considered is likely to interact more closely with it, and is therefore more likely to contribute to the analysis. • MaxCommonUncontrollables. This heuristic selects the automaton with the maximum number of relevant-uncontrollable events in common with the system considered so far. If two automata have the same number of relevant-uncontrollable events in common, the automaton with the highest number of relevant-controllable events in common is considered. This heuristic is similar to the MaxCommonEvents heuristic, but is adapted to controllability checks. • MinEvents. This heuristic selects the automaton with the smallest number of relevant events, the motivation being selecting the simplest automata to construct the smallest possible synchronous product.
• MinNewEvents. This heuristic selects the automaton adding the minimum number of additional relevant events to the set of events of the system considered. This heuristic is similar to the MaxCommonEvents heuristic, which looks for an automaton interacting closely with the system considered. • MinStates. This heuristic selects the automaton with the minimum number of states. This heuristic is similar to the MinEvents heuristic, the idea being constructing the smallest possible synchronous product. • MinTransitions. This heuristic selects the automaton with the minimum number of transitions. This heuristic is very similar to the MinStates heuristic but considers the number of transitions instead of the number of states as a measure of size.
• One. This heuristic simply selects the first automaton found.
• RelMaxCommonEvents. This heuristic selects the automaton with the maximum ratio of shared relevant events with the system considered to the automaton relevant alphabet. This heuristic is similar to the MaxCommonEvents strategy, but tries to avoid adding complex automata with large relevant alphabets, sharing few relevant events with the system considered. For example, an automaton with four relevant events, of which two are shared with the system considered (ratio: 2 to 4), is preferred to an automaton with twenty relevant events, sharing five relevant events with the system considered (ratio: 5 to 20). As discussed in Section IV-B, it may be preferable, if possible, to augment subsystems instead of the compositions of requirements when checking controllability. Accordingly, a further heuristic consists of selecting requirement automata only in case all system automata are found to accept the counterexample under consideration. This heuristic has been implemented in combination with the above heuristics, resulting in two variations for each, one variation preferring system automata over requirement automata whenever possible, the other variation not preferring system automata over requirement automata.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A scalable transfer line is considered first to i) compare the incremental verification approaches presented with straightforward state exploration, and ii) measure the computation efforts for increasing system complexity. A number of complex industrial applications are considered next to compare different heuristics, and assess the applicability of incremental verification to complex industrial examples.
A. Transfer Line Example
A scalable transfer line [5] is considered. It consists of functional blocks, shown in Fig. 6 , which can be combined into a large, scalable system with regular structure.
Each block consists of a machine followed by a test unit , linked by two buffers and . The machines are a simplified version of the machines of the manufacturing example of Section IV-A. They can start and finish operating. Workpieces can be loaded into the test unit , which in turn accepts or rejects them. If accepted, a workpiece is released and transferred to the next block, if rejected it is returned to the buffer for processing by . The buffer capacities for and are 3 and 1, respectively. A functional block labeled , modeled using five automata, is shown in Fig. 7 . The machine and test unit behaviors are modeled by the automata Machinei and . The behavioral requirements , , and specify that the two buffers must not underflow and overflow. A loading unit, used to load work pieces into the first block of the transfer line, is also shown in Fig. 7 , modeled by the automaton Init.
In spite of appearances, system complexity increases dramatically with the number of combined functional blocks. The total number of reachable states of the synchronous product can be calculated explicitly to be where is the number of combined functional blocks involved.
Transfer line models with 1 to 1000 functional blocks were verified to be controllable using on the one hand, incremental verification as proposed in Section IV-B, and on the other hand straightforward state exploration, i.e., building the synchronous product. Fig. 8 shows the number of states constructed versus the number of functional blocks considered.
The synchronous product grows so quickly that it is impossible to construct it explicitly for combined functional blocks, and symbolically using BDD's [13] for combined functional blocks. Incremental verification based on the LateNotAccept, MaxCommonEvents, or RelMaxCommonEvents heuristics, handles combined functional blocks easily (less than ten minutes of CPU time on a 600 MHz Pentium III processor with 512 MB of RAM), the number of states constructed growing linearly.
Further results are shown in Table I comparing the heuristics of Section IV-C. Verification runs were performed for different numbers of functional blocks, recording the total number of states constructed in all proof steps, as well as the maximum number of automata composed in a single step. The number of states constructed in a verification step was limited to 1 000 000, if exceeded the run was aborted, and the corresponding table entry left blank. No preference was given to the selection of system automata or requirement automata.
Some heuristics are seen to perform poorly, constructing more states than the synchronous product. However, most heuristics succeeded in proving controllability of the entire system, never composing more than six or eight automata at a time. In summary, we conclude that the incremental verification approaches presented, while having a worst-case exponential complexity, can solve some problems in linear time.
B. Industrial Application Examples
The incremental verification approaches presented have been tested with complex industrial examples and case studies taken from various application areas such as manufacturing systems, communication protocols, and automotive body electronics. All examples considered are listed below, together with the corresponding automata models, also referred to in Tables II and III. • BMW E65 CAS window-lift controller [14] , [15] : big _cmft_kl50, big_fh_cmftreq1, big_manual_cmft, big _cmft_reg, big_fh_cmftreq0, big_bmw.
• Case study production cell I [16] : fzelle.
• Case study production cell II [17] : ftechnik, ftechnik_no-coll.
• PROFIsafe field bus protocol [18] [19] [20] : profisafe _i4_host_to, profisafe_o4_host_to, profisafe_i4_slave, profisafe_o4_slave, profisafe_i4, profisafe_o4.
• AIP automated manufacturing system [21] [22] [23] :
rhone_alps.
• Train testbed [24] : tbed_uncont, tbed_nocoll, tbed _noderail, tbed_ctct, tbed_valid.
• Central locking system (KORSYS project): verriegel4_vr-prop, verriegel4_erprop, verriegel4. Considering in turn all the heuristics of Section IV-C, behavioral inclusion checks were carried out for 14 different behavioral requirements and all examples were checked to be controllable. Note that controllability was checked in three different ways.
i) not preferring system automata over requirement automata; ii) preferring system automata over requirement automata; iii) considering uncontrollable events one at a time and not preferring system automata over requirement automata. The results of all test runs are shown in Tables II and III . The first two columns list the model name and the number of automata for each model. The subsequent column pairs list for each heuristic and all examples the maximum number of automata composed, and the total number of states constructed. Each table is split into two blocks: the examples above the horizontal line satisfy the property considered (language inclusion or controllability), whereas the examples below the horizontal line do not satisfy the property considered.
The number of states constructed in a single verification step was limited to 2 000 000, if exceeded the run was aborted and the corresponding table entry left blank. This number was chosen small to keep the test run times reasonably short; increasing it was seen to have no impact on the test results.
In spite of the complexity of the models, these could all be shown to satisfy or not satisfy behavioral inclusion and controllability, requiring less than ten minutes of CPU time using a 600 MHz Pentium III processor with 512 MB of RAM. This amount of memory is enough to explicitly construct state spaces with approximately reachable states. Note that all the ex- amples considered have state spaces in excess of reachable states, which could not be constructed explicitly.
Figs. 9 and 10, respectively, summarize the data from Tables II and III. They show the total number of automata constituting the model being checked versus the maximum number of automata used by the incremental-verification algorithms presented. Note that for each model, only the maximum number of automata used by successful heuristics with the minimum use of automata is shown. Note that in Fig. 10 , for each model the data points corresponding to the three alternative controllability checks considered are connected by a vertical line.
The maximum number of automata used by incremental verification is seen to remain constant as the total number of automata constituting the model increases. This is particularly the case in Fig. 9 . In comparison, straightforward-state exploration requires using all the automata constituting the model being checked.
From Fig. 10 , we can see that preferring system automata over requirements automata does not usually bring the expected gain in performance although it can sometimes help, as seen in Table III . Closer investigation of the models for which preferring system automata over requirements automata did not help; it showed that the corresponding requirements could only be shown to be controllable if combined together. Furthermore, Fig. 10 suggests that checking controllability one uncontrollable event at a time typically reduces the maximum number of automata used. Nevertheless, inspection of Table III shows this approach does not perform much better than the other approaches presented, typically requiring more checks to be carried out thereby increasing the chances of failed proof searches.
Closer inspection of Tables II and III reveals further insights into the behavior of the different heuristics. The MaxCommonEvents heuristic, not preferring system behaviors, can be seen to be the only consistently successful heuristic but not necessarily the most efficient; sometimes constructing more states than for example the MaxCommonUncontrollables heuristic for controllability. The heuristics EarlyNotAccept and LateNotAccept outperform MaxCommonEvents in some cases. In contrast, the heuristics MinEvents, MinStates, and MinTransitions, which select automata according to a measure of size, are seen to perform poorly; apparently size is not a good criterion when selecting an automaton on the basis of counterexamples acceptance.
For all the examples considered, we either obtained a proof (positive or negative) in a few minutes of CPU time with a certain upper limit, or this upper limit was exceeded and the proof search failed. This suggests that to maximize the chances of obtaining a proof it may make sense not to focus on one heuristic in particular, but to consider several heuristics, letting each run up to an empirical time upper limit.
In summary, the incremental verification approaches presented were seen to be successful in checking behavioral inclusion and controllability for a number of complex industrial examples and case studies.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article presented new approaches to system verification and synthesis based on subsystem verification and the combined use of counterexamples and heuristics to identify suitable subsystems incrementally, thereby bringing about important computational advantages.
The scope of safety properties considered was limited in this article to behavioral inclusion and controllability.
The examples considered provided a comparison of the approaches presented with straightforward-state exploration and an understanding of their applicability in an industrial context. While having a worst case exponential complexity, these were shown to have the potential of solving some problems in linear time and were shown to be successful in checking behavioral inclusion and controllability for a number of complex industrial applications.
Two areas for future work have been identified: i) the extension of the approaches presented to discrete-event system synthesis, and in particular to the development of automatic incremental synthesis procedures, and ii) the investigation of alternative subsystem selection heuristics in combination with state-space reduction techniques, such as symbolic representations or partial-order reduction.
